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1 Introduction
Semantic theorizing about clause-types proceeds by identifying a canonical discourse role dis-
played by sentences of clause-type T, then assigning sentences of type T semantic values that—
perhaps together with independent pragmatic principles linking semantic values to discourse
functions—allow them to play their canonical discourse role. Declaratives are assigned propo-
sitions as their semantic values to account, inter alia, for the canonical link between declaratives
and the speech act of assertion. Interrogatives are assigned partitions as their semantic values
to account, inter alia, for the canonical link between interrogatives and the speech act of ques-
tioning. In such theorizing, the canonical cognitive role displayed by sentences of type T—e.g.,
the mental state canonically involved in accepting a sentence of type T—does not figure cen-
trally in accounting for their meaning, though it may be derived as a kind of “downstream” (e.g.,
perlocutionary) effect of the canonical discourse role that is identified for T-sentences.
This is a successful and widely accepted methodology for semantic theorizing about clause-
types, which recent work on imperatives takes largely for granted. Portner’s theory of impera-
tives is a well-known example (Portner 2004, 2007, 2012, forthcominga). The major competitor
account to Portner’s—the modal theory of imperatives championed most persuasively by Kauf-
mann, on which imperatives are assigned modal propositions as their semantic values (Schwager
2007; Kaufmann & Schwager 2011; Kaufmann 2012)—is another.
This essay will describe an alternative methodology for theorizing about the semantics of
imperatives—and clause-typesmore generally—onwhich their canonical cognitive role is treated
as semantically fundamental—and encoded in the semantic value of an imperative—and their
canonical discourse role is derived as a kind of “downstream” effect of their canonical cognitive
role. It is worth mentioning upfront why this sort of methodology might be reasonably regarded
as a non-starter in the case of imperatives. Strikingly, unlike declaratives and interrogatives,
imperatives strongly resist embedding as the complements of attitude verbs.1
(1) a. Bernie knows that Hillary shut the door
b. Bernie knows whether Hillary shut the door
c. *Bernie knows [*that] shut the door, Hillary
Since there are precious few, if any, grammatical attitude constructions embedding imperatives
as their complements, it would seem difficult to approach the semantics of imperatives by asking
after the semantics of such constructions.2 Indeed, the difficulty of locating a canonical way of
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1. In many languages (English included), imperatives appear to embed under speech act verbs (e.g. ‘say’) (see,
e.g., Crnic & Trinh 2008; Kaufmann & Poschmann 2013). This does not vitiate the observation in the main text.
2. The classic discussion of the relation between the semantics of interrogatives and the semantics of attitude
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ascribing a psychological relation between an agent and an imperative sentence might be taken
to suggest that imperatives lack anything like a canonical cognitive role at all.
I nevertheless will argue that this alternative methodology is worth pursuing in the case of
imperatives (though not, of course, via the semantics of uninterpretable constructions like (1c)).
The argument in this paper will be somewhat indirect, but the general idea is as follows. Ac-
counts of imperative meaning like Portner’s seem to suffer from explanatory deficits vis-à-vis
imperatives embedded in conditionals and under quantifiers. A modal account like Kaufmann’s
offers an appealing alternative, but has its own explanatory deficits (owing mainly to its assign-
ment of a proposition as the semantic content of an imperative). These latter deficits are most
clear when one considers the canonical cognitive role for an imperative—a role that, while some-
what difficult to access via attitude ascription, is easier to access via philosophical psychology and
cognitive science—to which a propositional account of the imperative seems to be committed.
This essay will motivate an alternative paradigm for theorizing about the semantics and
pragmatics of imperatives. On the analysis advanced here, imperatives express contents that are
both cognitively and semantically related to, but nevertheless distinct from, modal propositions
(compare the position ultimately defended in Charlow 2014a). Imperatives, on this analysis, se-
mantically encode features of planning that aremodally specified. Uttering an imperative amounts
to tokening this feature in discourse, and thereby proffering it for adoption by the audience. This
analysis deals smoothly with the problems afflicting the accounts of Portner and Kaufmann. It
also suggests an (in my view) appealing reorientation of clause-type theorizing in which the
cognitive act of updating on a typed sentence plays a central role in theorizing about both its
semantics and role in discourse.
2 Clause-Type Analysis: A Very Short Overview
Three major clause-types appear to be attested across natural languages: declarative, interroga-
tive, and imperative.3
(2) a. Hillary shut the door. [Type: dec]
b. Did Hillary shut the door? [Type: int]
c. Shut the door, Hillary! [Type: imp]
Clause-types tend to be seen as broadly conventional encodings of the clause’s “force” (in a sense
to be precisified). Conversely, themajor types of “force” are presumed to have dedicated linguistic
devices for their expression—a fact that suggests at least a partial explanation of the universality
of the three major clause-types (see esp. Sadock & Zwicky 1985; Portner 2004).
2.1 Force
In what sense is “force” encoded in a sentence’s clause-type? The most natural reading of “force”
would be Austin’s (1975) notion of illocutionary force.4 Portner (2004), however, rejects the idea
ascriptions embedding interrogatives is Karttunen (1977). Cremers & Chemla (2016) offer an updated assessment,
proposing a revision to the standard the semantics of interrogatives motivated by considerations involving the seman-
tics of attitude ascriptions embedding interrogatives.
3. An overview of clause-typing and its role in semantic and pragmatic theorizing is provided by Portner (2004),
which in turns draws on Sadock & Zwicky (1985); Ginzburg & Sag (2001), among others. Universally attested clause-
types are here labeled as “major”. Non-universally attested clause-types (like the Korean promissive) are generally
assumed to derive their core semantic features from universally attested clause-types (like the imperative); from a
semantic perspective, then, the Korean promissive, may be (and typically is) regarded as a sub-type of the imperative
(see, e.g., Portner 2004: §4).
4. This essay mostly elides the distinction between illocutionary force—a notion tied to speaker meaning in
context—and what has been termed dynamic force—a notion tied to the informational change induced by updating
2
Clause-Type, Force, and Normative Judgment in the Semantics of Imperatives 3
that illocutionary force could be encoded at the level of clause-type, citing examples of sentences
that exhibit an apparent mismatch of clause-type and illocutionary force, like:
(3) Can you pass the salt?
[Type: int; Illocutionary Force: request]
But this would be premature. The literature is replete with analyses on which a speaker uttering a
sentence like (3) performs a request by asking a question (Searle 1975; Asher & Lascarides 2001;
Charlow 2011: Ch. 3). On such analyses, the (primary) illocutionary act of asking a question
maywell be encoded in the clause-type of (3), while the (secondary, or, more commonly, indirect)
illocutionary act ofmaking a requestmay be derived from the primary illocutionary act, together
with some form of conversational (e.g. Gricean) reasoning.5
This is important to appreciate, sincemany influential objections to specific clause-type anal-
yses of the imperative beginwith the observation that imperatives arewell-suited for awide range
of illocutionary ends, beyond what we might call directive ends. Here are some standard exam-
ples (some borrowed fromWilson & Sperber 1988).
(4) Come earlier (if you like) [permission]
(5) Have an apple! [invitation]
(6) Take the A-Train (to get to Harlem) [instruction]
(7) Get well soon! [well-wish]
(8) Throw it, I dare you! [dare/threat]
Following Condoravdi & Lauer (2012), we can provisionally understand an utterance of an im-
perative with a directive end as one that “(I) expresses a certain content related to the addressee’s
future actions; (II) conveys that the speaker wants the content to become reality; and (III) acts
as an inducement for the addressee to bring about the content” (38).6 It is clear that none of the
above examples are naturally counted as directive uses of the imperative, in this sense.
It is sometimes alleged that, in light of such examples, any analysis of the imperative which
conventionalizes its directive “force” cannot be correct.7 But this objection loses a great deal of its
appeal, once a satisfying treatment of, e.g., (3) under the rubric of indirect speech acts is in view.
Like (3), any of these sentencesmight naturally receive the indicated illocutionary interpretation,
despite a conventional association with an altogether distinct illocutionary force.
a context or cognitive state on a sentence (Yalcin forthcoming). It is more accurate to say that clause-type analy-
ses associate sentences—in virtue of associating them with canonical discourse roles—with a canonical dynamic (or
para-illocutionary; see note 5) force, rather than illocutionary force proper. The account I go to develop will be in
this spirit.
5. Asher & Lascarides (2001) include the question expressed by (3) as part of what is meant, by the speaker, with
an utterance of (3): the speaker literally performs both the illocutionary act of questioning and the illocutionary act
of questioning with such an utterance (compare also Lepore & Stone forthcoming). This idea has some limitations;
I prefer, instead, to think of the question interpretation of (3) as being defeated, in a typical context, at some stage
of conversational reasoning, with the request interpretation being supplied in its stead by abduction (Charlow 2011:
Ch. 3). Whether the question survives as a bona fide illocutionary act, on my own analysis—or as a kind of para-
illocutionary act—is a question of terminology.
6. I say “provisionally” because there are clearly directive uses of imperatives that do not convey that “the speaker
wants the content to become reality,” a point of which Condoravdi and Lauer are aware. (Consider a speaker known to
have been coerced, against her own desires, to deliver an order to an addressee, and who does so with an imperative.)
I suggest a different, more or less Gricean, understanding of direction in §5.3.
7. Representative statements may be found at Schwager (2007: 241); Condoravdi & Lauer (2012: 40).
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2.2 Individuating Types
It is similarly important to emphasize the various shapes an account of the clause-type/force link
might take. One (unappealing) option is that clause-type is an abstraction from force, clause-type
being simply a way of categorizing sentences according to an independently attested canonical
discourse role or force. But this risks conflating two sentences ofmanifestly different clause-types
that share a discourse role, like (2b) and its performative analogue (9):
(9) I hereby query whether Hillary shut the door
More plausibly, instantiation of a clause-type T is the feature in virtue of which sentences
of type T are associated by the grammar with a canonical discourse role or force. What type of
feature would this be—morphosyntactic or semantic? Perhaps sentences of type T are so-typed
in virtue of containing a silent forcemarker in their syntax (e.g., Han 1998), in which case clausal
typing falls plausibly within the domain of Universal Grammar. Perhaps sentences of type T are
so-typed according to language-specific morphosyntactic properties (like wh-movement or a
null subject and uninflected verb), in which case clausal typing falls plausibly within the domain
of the language-specific grammar. Finally, perhaps sentences of type T are so-typed according
to features of their semantic values—perhaps according to the model-theoretic type of semantic
value, or something more fine-grained still.
Clause-type analysis, per se, requires none of these options. The common metalinguistic
representation of a typed clause with a sentential operator scoping over an untyped clause—e.g.,
representing the sentences in (2) using “force operators” (like the Fregean assertion operator `,
a question operator ?, or an imperative operator !) scoping over untyped “sentence radicals”—is,
in fact, neutral between the understandings of clause-typological individuation just described. In
particular, such a representation—in a regimented formal metalanguage, à laMontague (1973)—
need not (and generally does not) purport to realistically represent the actual syntax of the cor-
responding sentence in natural language.
This a well-appreciated point in the literature. A related, but somewhat less well-appreciated,
point is that distinct clause-typesmight be represented in themetalanguage as varying, not along
the force operator dimension, but rather along another dimension altogether. It is, for instance,
open to us to represent one clause-type as somehow parasitic or dependent on another clause-
type. Imperatives, for example, might be represented in the metalanguage as being derived from
related (e.g., modal) declaratives—perhaps, as I will ultimately suggest, by some type-shifting
operation—without object-language imperatives being actually derived frommodal declaratives,
or in fact containing a modal in their morphosyntax at all.
This flexibility allows a certain kind of theorist (mine) to prescind from many of the ques-
tions that have lately animated the linguistic literature on imperatives. Do imperatives contain
modals?8 Are there force operators in syntax? I do not propose to answer these questions here.
Can the semantics of imperatives be theorized about, under the rubric of clause-type analysis,
while availing ourselves of the tools of our best theories of linguistic modality? Could impera-
tives have a “modal semantics”—even while failing to display some of the hallmarks of linguistic
modality? That will mostly depend on the explanatory attractions of the semantics. I will later
suggest that there are enough for us to respond to these questions with a cautious yes.9
8. Kaufmann argues yes (see esp. Kaufmann 2012). Portner argues no (see esp. Portner 2007). von Fintel &
Iatridou (2009, forthcoming) side tentatively with Portner.
9. Roberts (2015) represents another account in this general vein.
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2.3 Semantic Value and Content
Since clause-type analysis aspires to provide a semantics for—or at least a rubric for theorizing
about the semantics of—typed clauses, it is important to know what type of semantic theory is
supposed to be on offer. There are at least two options. The program of modern Generative
Semantics is generally understood as providing a compositional characterization of a sentence’s
semantic value, with an eye to revealing what semantic competence with respect to that sentence
consists in. Semantic theorizing in more philosophical circles tends to aim at something dif-
ferent: a (possibly noncompositional) characterization of the (typically propositional) content
conventionally proffered by a sincere utterance of a sentence.10 What type of semantic theorizing
is clause-type analysis engaged in?
Clause-type analyses—like that of Portner, as well as, for example, Roberts (1996, 2015,
forthcoming)—should generally be read as offering a semantic analysis in the second sense (which
is, of course, not to say that they involve any sort of rejection of the Generative program). Port-
ner describes a tight relationship between (i) model-theoretic type of semantic value and (ii)
canonical discourse role. The semantic values of declaratives—propositions—are fit for the illo-
cutionary act of assertion (and when tokened in discourse are added by default to the Common
Ground); the semantic values of interrogatives—questions—are fit for the illocutionary act of
questioning (and when tokened in discourse are added by default to the list of Questions under
Discussion, à la Roberts (1996)). It is well-understood that assertoric content often diverges from
compositional semantic value; indeed formany purposes it does notmakemuch sense to say that
the compositional semantic value of a declarative is a proposition, in the ordinary sense—i.e. a
thing fit for the content of assertion and belief, and the object of credence—at all (Lewis 1980;
Ninan 2010). Portner (and Roberts) thus seem to be giving analyses that link conventionally
proffered contents to canonical discourse roles.
Clause-type theorizing, so understood, does place constraints on compositional semantic
theorizing—and vice versa—since there is assumed to be some sort of determinative relation
holding between compositional semantic value and conventionally proffered content. But the
constraints are plausibly looser than is ordinarily assumed in the literature on imperatives. Con-
sider the possibility that (i) the conventionally proffered content of an imperative is modeled
with a modal operator, (ii) no corresponding modal operator is witnessed in our representation
of the imperative’s compositional semantic value.11 Such a proposal would free the clause-type
theorist to explore the conventionally proffered content of an imperative via a modally loaded
account of its canonical discourse role—or better, as I will ultimately suggest, a modally loaded
account of its its canonical cognitive role—while sidestepping definite commitments in the realm
of compositional semantics.
2.4 Canonical Cognitive Role
We’ve seen that clause-type analysis is naturally understood as offering a rubric for theorizing
about the content conventionally proffered by an utterance of a typed clause. Conventionally
proffered contents are posited to explain, inter alia, what is said by an utterance in a standard
context of utterance. Conventionally proffered contents are, in other words, things proffered by
10. On the distinction, see Lewis (1980); Ninan (2010); Yalcin (2014). Though notions like ‘content’ have unclear
purchase in certain (e.g., dynamic) frameworks, such frameworks do traffic in notions like conventionally proffered
meanings (in dynamic frameworks, these tend to be modeled as update instructions).
11. Such a proposal might raise the suspicion that the imperative’s conventionally proffered content stands in an
obscure relationship to its compositional semantic value. The alleged obscurity might be remedied with, for example,
an account of the determinative relation that holds between these entities, which does not amount to simple identity.
I can provide no such account here, since I take basic questions regarding the compositional semantic contribution of
the imperative to be unsettled.
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speakers for addition to the Common Ground, for cognitive adoption—acceptance—by conver-
sational participants, and so on.
(What is acceptance? I understand update and acceptance as loosely interdefinable: accep-
tance of content Cmay be understood in terms of redundant update on C, while updating on C
is a state that generally induces acceptance of C. Acceptance of an interrogative is, roughly, the
sort of state in which updating on that interrogative would be redundant.12)
Clause-type analysis suggests a link between the semantic content of a typed clause and the
attitude typically induced by an utterance of that clause. As the content of a typed clause de-
termines a canonical discourse role—whatever discourse role is associated, by default, with the
absorption of such a content into the context—it also determines a canonical cognitive role—
whatever cognitive role is associated, by default, with update on that content. Declaratives, as
devices for expressing propositions, are linked to propositional attitudes—attitudes taking em-
bedded declaratives as their complements, andwhich paradigmatically (in, e.g., the case of belief)
ascribe acceptance of the declarative’s content to the attitude-ascription’s subject. Interrogatives,
as devices for expressing questions, are linked to question-directed attitudes—attitudes taking
embedded interrogatives as their complements, and which paradigmatically (in, e.g., the case of
wondering) ascribe acceptance of an interrogative content to the attitude ascription’s subject.
The link between an analysis of clause-type T and attitudes taking sentences of type T as
complements must be stated with care, since (i) propositional attitude-ascriptions (e.g., desire-
ascriptions) need not ascribe acceptance of a propositional content to their subjects; (ii) inter-
rogative attitude-ascriptions (e.g., certain forms of knowledge-wh-ascription) need not ascribe
acceptance of an interrogative content, in the just-described sense, to their subjects.13
Such attitudes are not linked in the envisioned way to the posited canonical discourse role
for declaratives or interrogatives. Instead, clause-type analysis suggests an understanding of the
attitudes that are induced, by default, when an agent updates on the conventionally proffered
content of a typed clause: a “core” propositional attitude, like belief (or something close, like
conditionalization of one’s probabilities on a propositional content), in the case of declaratives;
a “core” interrogative attitude, like issue-sensitivity (or something close, like wondering wh-), in
the case of interrogatives. In this way, a sentence’s canonical cognitive role may be derived from
its canonical discourse role via its conventionally proffered content.
12. A useful comparison is with Stalnaker (2002). Stalnaker uses ‘acceptance’ to delimit “a category of propositional
attitudes and methodological stances toward a proposition, a category that includes belief, but also some attitudes
(presumption, assumption, acceptance for the purposes of an argument or an inquiry) that contrast with belief, and
with each other” (716). Like Stalnaker’s notion, my notion of acceptance is broader than belief: one might accept
that p (in the context of, say, a supposition), without believing that p; in my idiom, this means that, in the context
of the relevant supposition, updating on p would be redundant. Unlike Stalnaker’s notion, my notion of acceptance
encompasses attitudes (like wondering) whose functional role is not to be understood as serving up a propositional
content for the sake of some cognitive activity.
13. Point (i) is obvious. On point (ii), I do notmean that, since knowledge-wh ascriptions ascribe knowledge to their
subjects, they do not ascribe uncertainty, hence do not ascribe acceptance of an interrogative content. Acceptance of an
interrogative content is to be sharply distinguished fromuncertainty about how to answer the question expressed by the
interrogative: uncertainty about some proposition does not imply acceptance of a corresponding interrogative content,
nor does acceptance of an interrogative content imply uncertainty about its propositional answers. A subject can
recognize the issue expressed by the embedded interrogative—can partition her information along the lines suggested
by the interrogative—even when she is not uncertain about how to resolve it; example (1b) is naturally read in this
manner. Consider, however, non-exhaustive (e.g., mention-some) readings of embedded interrogatives.
(10) Maria knows where to buy an Italian newspaper
(11) Maria knows how to play guitar
It is enough for the truth of (10) that when Maria wants an Italian newspaper, she reliably will go to a place where an
Italian newspaper is available for purchase. Similarly a sufficient condition for (11) is that Maria is able to play guitar.
Asking Maria where to buy an Italian newspaper, or how to play guitar, is liable to raise cognitively novel issues for
her. Thanks here to Simon Charlow.
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3 Portner
This section and the next will situate the accounts of imperatives developed by Paul Portner and
Magdalena Kaufmann within the understanding of clause-type analysis sketched in this section.
I will raise some (more or less) empirical doubts about both types of account.
3.1 Dynamic Pragmatics
Portner develops his analysis of the imperative within the framework of what he terms Dynamic
Pragmatics.14 His description of the program’s key tenets:
Dynamic Pragmatics
i. Sentences have standard static semantic values.
ii. The communicative effect of utterances in discourse is modeled as the effect they
have on the discourse context.
iii. The effect of a particular sentence is determined by pragmatic principles on the
basis of the sentence’s form or semantics (Portner forthcominga: page)
He links Dynamic Pragmatics to clause-type analysis as follows:
Semantic Values
i. The semantic value of a declarative sentence is a proposition.
ii. The semantic value of an interrogative sentence is a set of propositions.
iii. The semantic value of an imperative sentence is a property restricted to one in-
dividual (the addressee). (ibid., page)
Force Assignment
The force of a root sentence S is a function updating the discourse context by addingJSK to the component of the context which is a set of objects from the same semantic
domain as JSK (ibid., page)
Dynamic Pragmatics, as pursued by Portner, involves a specific form of clause-type analysis,
in the sense we have sketched. Sentences are assigned a clause-type representation according
to the model-theoretic type of their conventionally proffered content. A sentence’s canonical
discourse role is derived from its clause-type representation: given an utterance of a sentence at
a context, a parameter of that context is selected for update according to the semantic type of its
conventionally proffered content. The canonical discourse role of a sentence (with conventionally
proffered content of semantic type t) is the addition of its conventionally proffered content to
a contextual parameter that records the conventionally proffered contents of utterances—when,
but only when, that content is of type t.
It is important to remember that Portner does not encode illocutionary force at the level of
clause-type: addition of a content of propositional type to a contextual parameter that records
contents of propositional type—i.e., a set of propositions—may correspond to assertion (when
the relevant contextual parameter is the Common Ground), but to a distinct illocutionary act as
well (when the relevant set of propositions is distinguished from the Common Ground). More
generally, the illocutionary force of an utterance of a typed clause with conventionally proffered
content of semantic type t is, for Portner, a function, not only of its clause-type, but also which
record (or records) of t-type contents the utterance targets for update.
14. This exposition draws from Portner (2004, 2007, 2012, forthcominga).
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3.2 Many To-Do Lists
The semantic value of an imperative is, for Portner, an addressee-restricted property:
Jshut the door!Kc = lx : x = addresseec . x shuts the door
By the Force Assignment principle, the force of uttering an imperative is to add the utterance’s
semantic value to a dedicated contextual record: a set of entities of the same semantic type.
Portner dubs such sets “To-Do Lists,” and introduces a To-Do List function—typed, roughly, as
a function from individuals into their To-Do Lists—as a novel parameter of the context (Portner
2004, 2007, 2012).15 Within this framework, Portner attempts to account for the wide varieties
in illocutionary force associated with imperative utterances by appeal to one of the following:
 The existence of different species of commitmentwithin an individual’s To-Do List (e.g.,
deontic, legal, bouletic, teleological). Commands interpretations, perhaps, involve up-
dates to an agent’s deontic To-Do’s. Suggestion interpretations, perhaps, involve updates
to her bouletic To-Do’s. (Portner 2007)
 Contextual factors. Apermission interpretation of an imperative, for example, is claimed
to arise in contexts where property that is inconsistent with the property expressed by
the imperative is already present on the addressee’s To-Do List. (Portner 2012)
A signal attraction of the account is what we might call its illocutionary “flexibility”—its
broad structural adaptability to uses of imperatives that have stymied competitor accounts. As an
illustration, Portner (forthcominga) jettisons the assumption that there is a single To-Do List for
each individual. The objective here is to account for a further aspect of variability in imperative
usage: variability in imperative strength, of the sort attested in the following minimal pair:
(12) a. Take a seat* [weak]
b. Take a seat+ [strong]
Rising imperatives are naturally associated with invitations or suggestions, falling imperatives
with orders or directives.16
Portner’s strategy here will seem familiar: illocutionary variability is variation in which To-
Do List(s) are selected for update, as a function of the imperative’s intonational profile.
 Rising imperatives propose to add their content to a To-Do List that represents the ad-
dressee’s representation of her own commitments.
 Falling imperatives propose to add their content to a To-Do List that represents the
speaker’s representation of the addressee’s commitments.
Portner’s account achieves a remarkable degree of coverage—a degree that is, in principle,
indefinitely extensible, through the further proliferation of To-Do Lists—over the wide range of
illocutionary variety attested in imperative utterances. But, I will now argue, it is has prima facie
15. The conceptual foundations for a To-Do List account—in particular, the functional role of the To-Do List in
a general account of practical rationality and conversation—seem to merit further consideration. Portner (forth-
cominga) writes that “the to-do list defines a pre-order over the context set and an action by participant p is deemed
rational and cooperative if it tends to make it the case that the actual world is maximally highly ranked according
to p’s to-do list” (see also Portner 2007: 358). Rationality, as I understand it, is tied to an agent’s maximization of
subjective expected utility, which has little—as best I can see—to do with her To-Do List.
16. The association is not conventional. Rising imperatives can, for example, receive extremely strong interpreta-
tions (don’t you dare*). Portner need not commit himself to any such conventional association in order to display
the illocutionary flexibility of the clause-type analysis he favors.
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difficulty accounting, even in principle, for two kinds of embeddings of the imperative: as the
matrix clause of a conditional, and under apparently quantificational operators.17
3.3 Conditional Imperatives
Conditional imperatives like (13) exhibit the familiar characteristics of ordinary, or uncondi-
tional, imperatives (for a helpful catalogue, see Roberts 2015).
(13) If it starts to rain, shut the door
In particular, conditional imperatives, like ordinary imperatives, tend strongly to have a direc-
tive function in discourse (which can, as ever, be modulated by contextual variation, intonation,
and so on). We can “operationalize” this directive function by noticing that utterances of imper-
atives of any type tend to make true (or else be grounded in the truth of) a corresponding modal
statement like (14).18
(14) If it starts to rain, you [should/must] the door
From the perspective of clause-type analysis, the shared characteristics of conditional and or-
dinary imperatives might seem unremarkable. Indicative conditionals are standardly assigned
a clause-type as a function of the clause type of their main clause (i.e., consequent) (Bhatt &
Pancheva 2006), while indicative antecedents are surmised to express a kind of restrictive opera-
tion on the semantic value of the main clause (à la Kratzer 1981, 1991).19 From this perspective,
conditional imperatives are nothing special: conditional imperatives are imperatives, and pro-
pose some sort of property—restricted in some fashion by their antecedents—for addition to the
addressee’s To-Do List(s).
In fact, however, Portner’s Dynamic Pragmatic account sits uneasily with these pieces of
orthodoxy. If a sentence like (13) is typed as imperative, its semantic value will be given by a
logical form of roughly the shape in (15):
(15) [if it starts to rain][lxaddressee[x shuts the door]]
Such a logical form is, however, problematic: there is apparently no operator present for the
if-clause to restrict.20 If this is how conditional imperatives are represented at logical form, con-
ditional imperatives are semantically ill-formed.
But let us bracket this worry, and assume that a logical form of the right type is computable
17. For earlier discussion of this type of data for quantified imperatives, see Charlow (2010: 230–2); (2011: §4.4.7).
On conditional imperatives, see Charlow (2011: §4.5); (2014a: 652ff); (2014b: 546ff).
18. The connection between imperatives and corresponding modal statements is perhaps their most carefully stud-
ied property. A chronological sampling of references that treat this connection as theoretically central: Åqvist (1964);
Han (1998); Aloni (2007); Schwager (2007); Portner (2007); Charlow (2011); Kaufmann (2012); Charlow (2014a);
Starr (forthcoming). Portner (forthcominga) makes the very interesting observation that a judgment of the truth of
(14) can both justify and be justified by a speaker’s utterance of (13), which I have taken on here.
19. Kaufmann (2012) argues convincingly that examples like (13) are bona fide “hypothetical” indicative condi-
tionals, i.e., not relevance (biscuit) conditionals or factual (echoic) conditionals. On my possibly idiosyncratic under-
standing of the hypothetical/non-hypothetical contrast, the antecedents of hypothetical conditionals contribute their
semantic values to the computation of the semantic value of the entire conditional structure, while the antecedents of
non-hypothetical conditionals perform some other non-semantic function (e.g., signaling relevance).
20. Ordinarily, Kratzer (1991) suggests, we may posit an unpronounced epistemic necessity modal so that the
compositional function of the if-clause may be fulfilled. This suggestion is a non-starter for conditional imperatives:
quite unlike ordinary imperatives, this would wrongly construe directive uses of conditional imperatives as directives
concerning features of an epistemic state, rather than the addressee’s actions (vis-à-vis, say, the door).
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for (13). This property will have roughly the shape in (16):
(16) lxaddressee[x shuts the door if it starts to rain]
Such a content, being of the semantic type addressee-restricted property, is predicted, in Portner’s
Dynamic Pragmatics, to have the discourse profile typical of other property-type semantic values:
its canonical discourse function is to be added to some set of property-type semantic values, i.e.,
one or more of the To-Do Lists made available by the context of utterance.
This prediction is incorrect.21 Directive uses of conditional imperatives, as noted above,
tend tomake true (or else be grounded in the truth of) corresponding modal statements. But the
truth condition of a modalized conditional like (14) is not the presence of the property in (16)—
or of a proposition derived from that property, to the effect that the addressee shuts the door if it
starts to rain—on the ordering source relevant for the interpretation of the matrix modal of (14).
According to the basic analysis of Kratzer (1981), the truth condition of (14) is that the most
highly ranked (according to the ordering source) contextually relevant possibilities are ones in
which you shut the door. The mere presence of the property in (16) on an ordering source is not
sufficient for this (if, for example, an incompatible property is already present in the ordering
source, so that the ordering source, once updated with the relevant property, is indifferent or
lacks a preference between shutting and not shutting the door in the event of rain) (a point also
noted in Charlow (2011: 15ff); Condoravdi & Lauer (2012: 56)).22
But let us bracket this worry, too, and ask simply what sort of property is (16) supposed to
be? Trivially, the property of making a conditional true. What kind of conditional? I know of no
option other than the material conditional.23 Now consider the sequence in (17):
(17) a. Don’t rob me. lx[x does not rob speaker]
b. If you do, leave my phone. lx[x leaves speaker’s phone if x robs speaker]
This is as unremarkable a sequence of imperatives as one is likely to find.
Interpreted as the property of making a material conditional true, however, the addressee’s
satisfaction of the property in (17b) is logically guaranteed by the addressee’s satisfaction of the
property in (17a). In other words, (17b) adds aweaker demand to the relevant To-Do List(s) than
21. Portner (forthcomingb) has pondered the adoption a dynamic account of conditional imperatives, like the ones
defended in Charlow (2011); Starr (forthcoming). A dynamic account would, indeed, be well-positioned to accommo-
date the data presented in this section. This option is, however, foreclosed to Portner, given his broader programmatic
commitments to the shape of clause-type theorizing (cf. Charlow 2014a: 653). For the Dynamic Pragmaticist, “sen-
tences have standard static semantic values”; dynamic or discourse-level meanings must be derived by application of
the Force Assignment principle. More generally, a Portnerian Dynamic Pragmatic account is distinguished by assign-
ing sentences theoretically “minimal” semantic values: imperatives denote properties because they are null-subject
VPs, and null-subject VPs denote properties. If conditional imperatives turn out not to denote properties—something
that would be required for Portner to avoid the argument I am making here—it would seem that the Dynamic Prag-
matic program, as presented by Portner, is untenable after all.
22. Thus Portner predicts the possible coherence—in at least one sense of coherence—of a discourse sequence that
involves an imperative requiring p and an expression of permission allowing :p. There is, I argue elsewhere, strong
evidence that such sequences are semantically disallowed—literally contradictory (see, e.g., Charlow 2014a: 653–4).
It is possible for Portner to avoid this, by incorporating a revision procedure into his account, so that updating a To-Do
List tdl on an imperative requiring p makes it the case that tdl requires p, as in Starr (forthcoming). Such a revision
procedure, in my view, takes us outside the realm of semantic/pragmatic theorizing (Charlow 2014a: 654–6).
23. As I mentioned in note 20, construing directive uses of conditional imperatives as directives concerning an
epistemic state misconstrues what we might call their “subject-matter”. Indicative conditionals are, it is now widely
accepted, semantically evaluated relative to epistemic—or, more neutrally, informational—states. It follows that we
cannot construe the conditional embedded in (16) as an indicative conditional.
10
Clause-Type, Force, and Normative Judgment in the Semantics of Imperatives 11
(17a) (Charlow 2014a: 625–6). Such a discourse move is, however, ordinarily quite marked:24
(18) a. Leave my phone.
b. #If you rob me, leave my phone.
(19) a. Don’t take my possessions.
b. #Don’t take my phone.
The reason for this seems clear enough: conditional on having expressed an expectation that
someone see to it that f, expressing a weakened expectation (i.e., expressing the expectation that
someone see to it that y when f strictly entails y) is pragmatically unavailable (except, perhaps,
given explicit or implicit retraction of the earlier-expressed stronger expectation). But if this
holds true for (18) and (19), why would it not hold true for (17)?
I did not, of course, invent this sort of case—it is borrowed from the literature on Contrary-
To-Duty (or Second-Best) Obligations, which recent sophisticated treatments have analyzed uti-
lizing the information-sensitivity of expressions like deontic modals (and the ability of indicative
antecedents to shift the information against which information-sensitive material in their main
clauses is evaluated) (see, e.g., Willer 2014). Conditional imperatives, it is worth noting, appar-
ently display a sort of information-sensitivity that is quite similar to that exhibited by deontic
conditionals.25 Consider the following example (from Charlow 2014a: 625):26
(20) a. If it’s going to rain, take the umbrella (but leave the sunglasses)
b. If it’s not going to rain, take the sunglasses (but leave the umbrella)
c. Bring both (...since we don’t know)
Sequence (20) is, to my ear, unremarkable: (20a) and (20b) can be offered as conditional advice
the day before the referenced outing; (20c) can be offered as additional advice the day of the out-
ing, without any sense that the speaker is changing her mind or retracting her conditional advice.
(Notice that if, subsequent to the utterance of (20c), it begins to look as if it’s going to rain, the
speaker’s advice to take the umbrella will still apply to the addressee.) However, the properties ex-
pressed by these three imperatives, on my understanding of a Portnerian analysis of conditional
imperatives, are known by a competent speaker to be inconsistent—jointly logically unsatisfiable
by any agent. It is mysterious how a speaker could—without manifest incoherence—propose
such inconsistent properties for addition to the same To-Do List.
3.4 Quantified Imperatives
Quantified imperatives like (21) also exhibit familiar characteristics of ordinary imperatives.
(21) Everyonei take [his/her/their]i seat
In particular, quantified imperatives tend strongly to have a directive function in discourse (sub-
ject to the usual caveats). As before, one way of “operationalizing” this directive function is to
notice that utterances of quantified imperatives tend to make true (or else be grounded in the
24. Examples of allegedly “valid imperative inferences” adduced in the literature (in e.g. Vranas 2008, 2010; Parsons
2013) are, for this very reason, generally quite marked.
25. Formy own understanding of information-sensitivity in deontic conditionals, see Charlow (2013a). A hallmark
of information-sensitivity, on this sort of view, as noted byWiller (2012) (see also Yalcin 2012b), is the apparent failure
ofmodus tollens for natural language indicatives with information-sensitive consequents: rejection of the consequent
of such a conditional does not commit one to rejection of its antecedent (as seems clear from sequence (20)).
26. It is also worth mentioning that it is possible to recreate Kolodny &MacFarlane (2010)’s Miner Paradox—a core
data point in the case for information-sensitivity (see, among many others, Charlow 2013b; Cariani et al. 2013; Carr
2015)—with (weak) imperative, rather than deontic, conditionals. For the case, see Charlow (2010: 227).
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truth of) a corresponding modal statement like (22).
(22) Everyonei [should/must] take [his/her/their]i seat
A logical form of the right type would seem to be computable for (21):
(23) lxaddressee[x takes x’s seat]
Such a property would then be added, as indicated by the quantifier phrase, to each (relevant)
tdl(x), for each addressee x.
This is a prima facie satisfactory story about the canonical discourse role for (21).27 But
there is something curious about it: such a logical form involves the (unexplained) deletion of
the quantifier phrase everyone, which is subsequently treated as a discourse-level signal regarding
which To-Do Lists to select for update—the relevant tdl(x)’s, for each addressee x.
There is, to be clear, nothing mysterious about this sort of deletion when the deleted noun
phrase is vocative—serving to explicitly indicate the addressee, but obviously not part of the
relevant sentence’s logical form:
(24) Bernie, take your seat lx : x = Bernie[x takes x’s seat]
The fact that the quantifier phrase in (21) binds a pronoun seems, however, to indicate that it
cannot be considered vocative.28
There is another option for a Portnerian analysis to try out here: leave the quantifier phrase
in place, and (vacuously) l-abstract over the entire sentence.
(25) lxaddressee[everyonei takes [his/her/their]i seat]
The logical form in (25), though equivalent to a proposition, is nevertheless a property, and so is
fit for addition to the relevant To-Do List(s). Suppose, as seems forced, that this property is added
to each (relevant) tdl(x), for each addressee x. Ordinarily, this will have the effect of making it
required, of each addressee x, that x see to it that everyone takes their seat. In other words, we
have the makings of an explanation of why an imperative like (21) would tend to make true, or
else be grounded in the truth of, a modal statement like (26).
(26) Everyone [should/must] see to it that everyonei takes [his/her/their]i seat
The difficulty is that imperative (21) simply lacks the envisioned connection to modal statement
(26). (21) tends to make true, or else be grounded in the truth of, a modal statement like (22).
(22) describes an individual-level obligation concerning each person’s position relative to their
own chair. It does not describe a “state-level” obligation, as (26) seems to do, regarding each
person’s obligation to bring about a world that is preferred from the standpoint of the speaker—a
world in which everyone takes their seat.29
A final option is the introduction of a To-Do List indexed to a collective addressee—roughly,
the To-Do List for everyone.
(27) lx : x = everyone[x takes x’s seat]
27. Though it does face the problem, mentioned in the previous section, that the mere presence of a property on a
To-Do List is consistent with that To-Do List being indifferent between its agent taking a seat or not; see note 22.
28. See earlier discussion in Mauck et al. (2005); Charlow (2010). Second-person pronouns are, for some speakers,
preferred to third-person pronouns in examples like (21). So it is worth noting that there is strong reason to regard
treat second-person pronouns as being anaphorically bound in such examples (Mauck et al. 2005).
29. Compare the distinction between evaluative (state-level) and deliberative (individual-level) readings of priori-
tizing modals advocated in Schroeder (2011).
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This is not necessarily ad hoc: collective addressees are required for understanding imperative
utterances that target group actions (Charlow 2010: 231).
(28) Play Beethoven’s Fifth lx : x = the orchestra[x plays Beethoven’s Fifth]
A group action is, however, clearly not the target of (21), any more than it is the target of (22).
(In any case, while there is such a thing as the playing of Beethoven’s Fifth by the orchestra, there
is no such thing as everyone’s seat, and so there can be no action that involves the taking of it by
everyone.) As with conditional imperatives, the prospects for explaining the discourse role of
quantified imperatives in a Portnerian clause-type analysis are unclear.
4 Kaufmann
Our discussion of Portner has highlighted the following three features of imperatives:
 The tight discourse-level links—of somewhat indeterminate shape—between impera-
tives and corresponding modal statements
 The information-sensitivity of imperatives (witnessed in conditional imperatives)
 The ability of quantifier phrases to take non-vacuous “scope” over imperative “force”
Impressively, there is an account of imperatives that would seem to get all of these features for
free: the modal account, championed most comprehensively by Magdalena Kaufmann.
4.1 Imperatives as Performative Modals
Kaufmann (see Schwager 2007; Kaufmann & Schwager 2011; Kaufmann 2012) analyzes imper-
ative statements as modal statements. There are two theses to distinguish here: one about the
compositional semantics of imperatives—which Kaufmann supports with a wide range of lin-
guistic data—another about their conventionally proffered contents.
Imperatives Contain Modal Quantifiers
Imperatives contain prioritizing necessity modals in their compositional se-
mantics
Imperatives Express Modal Propositions
The conventionally proffered content of an imperative is a modal proposition
Since my interest here is confined to clause-type analysis of the imperative, I will here confine
my attention to the second of these theses (recall §2.3).30
The notion that Imperatives Express Modal Propositions invites an incredulous stare (as
Kaufmann appreciates). The behavior of imperatives in discourse is altogether distinct from
that of declaratives; indeed, this one of the insights around which clause-type analysis is built.
Imperative utterances strikingly resist characterization as true or false—indeed, attempts at such
30. von Fintel & Iatridou (2009, forthcoming) adduce interesting data from Imperative-and-Declarative (IaD) con-
structions (constructions like drink another beer and you’ll lose your lunch) that seems to suggest that (i) imperatives
do not contain prioritizing necessity modals in their compositional semantics; (ii) such constructions are best thought
of under the rubric of conditional conjunction (if you drink another beer, you’ll lose your lunch) (cf. Culicover &
Jackendoff 1997; Klinedinst & Rothschild 2012); (iii) for such constructions to function as conditional conjunctions,
imperatives must have the sort of “minimal” compositional semantics suggested by Portner. I am inclined to agree
with them, at least in part, but nothing here will turn on this, as I will explain.
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characterization are, in every case of which I am aware, ungrammatical—and, relatedly, seem not
to warrant the sorts of downstream discourse moves we normally take assertions to warrant—
affirmation (on grounds of truth), rejection (on grounds of falsity), and so on.31 In other words,
imperative utterances, quite unlike modal utterances, cannot be used to report or state standing
modal facts. This is quite surprising, if the conventionally proffered content of an imperative is
in fact a modal proposition.
The insight on which Kaufmann builds her account is that the striking differences between
imperatives and modal declaratives might be accounted for by appeal to the alleged performa-
tivity of imperative utterances. Imperative utterances, Kaufmann suggests, are performative in
exactly the way that performative uses of their corresponding modals are performative. Like
imperatives, performative utterances lack a reportative or descriptive function.
(29) A: I promise to be at your party
B: #No you don’t/#That’s false!
(30) Louis XIV decrees: You may not execute this peasant!
Executioner: #Yes, I may
Thus, if imperative utterances are a species of (obligatorily) performative modal utterances, we
can straightforwardly explain why imperatives cannot be used to report standing modal facts
(and hence, for example, cannot be targeted by the sorts of downstream discourse moves that
such reports tend to warrant).
What feature might make imperative utterances obligatorily performative and thus “shield
the truth value [of an imperative] from being conversationally accessible” (Kaufmann 2012: 57)?
Example (30) is suggestive here. A performative interpretation of a modal utterance is forced in
a context in which it is generally known that the modal facts are at the discretion, or under the
authority, of the speaker. The basic idea here is due to another target of the incredulous stare:
There is a certain symbol ! that may be prefixed to any sentence f to make a new sen-
tence !f, called an imperative sentence, that is true at t at w iff f is true at t at every
world that is both accessible and permissible at t at w... The [imperative] may be used
to command: the Master says it to the Slave, his purpose is to control the Slave’s ac-
tions by changing the sphere of permissibility, and truthfulness is automatic because
the sphere adjusts so that saying so makes it so. (Lewis 1979: 164–6, my emphasis)
A pressing question is whether actual conversationds share the features of Lewis’ “little lan-
guage game”? Plausibly, they do, provided that we understand the flavor of modality expressed
by the imperative in a sufficiently subtle manner—something like in view of what the speaker says
is X-necessary, where X may be any of the familiar flavors of modality: deontic, legal, bouletic,
teleological, and so forth (see esp. Kaufmann 2012: Ch. 4). Command uses of imperatives are
associated with an in view of what the speaker says she commands-flavor, suggestion uses with an
in view of what the speaker says is necessary for the addressee to fulfill her desires-flavor, and so
on. While Portner achieves variability in illocutionary force by appeal to differences in which
To-Do Lists are targeted for update by an imperative utterance, Kaufmann achieves variability
in illocutionary force by appeal to differences in which flavor of modality is expressed by the
imperative utterance’s modal logical form.32
31. Additionally, imperatives, as we have already seen, resist embedding in environments that ordinarily take propo-
sitional arguments: indicative antecedents, as the complements of propositional attitude verbs, etc. I here focus on
Kaufmann’s attempt to account for the diverse behavior of imperatives and modal declaratives in discourse. Differ-
ences in embeddability are plausibly due to the distinctive syntax of the imperative.
32. I have reservations regarding Kaufmann’s use of authority to achieve performative force, which she implements
via what she terms an Epistemic Authority Presupposition. This presupposition roughly enforces the speaker’s infalli-
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4.2 Explanations
A modal account seems immediately well-positioned to explain the links in discourse between
imperatives and corresponding modal statements. These are, on my understanding of Kauf-
mann’s account, akin to the links between the following two statements of deontic necessity:
(31) [Given what I say is X-necessary] you [should/must] shut the door
(32) [Given what is X-necessary] you [should/must] shut the door
These links might appear initially mysterious—what do the addressee’s actual obligations (given
X) have to do with what the speaker says is necessary (given X)? Kaufmann suggests that the
gap here is filled by the following principle, connecting sentences of the imperative clause-type
to affirmative speech acts:33
Ordering Source Affirmation
The speaker of an imperative utterance affirms the ordering source that deter-
mines the flavor of modality expressed by the imperative as the correct order-
ing source to use in practical deliberation for the addressee.
Suppose (32) expresses the verdict of an episode of practical deliberation, concerning what to
do relative to a decision problem that is salient in the context of utterance (Kaufmann 2012:
162). The speaker’s affirmation of the ordering source for her own imperative utterance as the
ordering source to consult in deliberation about what to do in the salient decision problem—if
accepted at the context—will reliably explain the truth of (32) in a context in which the imperative
utterance has been made. (If the affirmation is rejected, the suggested connection will fail, but
this is just what we would expect—a rejected imperative has no reliable effect on the truth of a
corresponding deontic modal.)
On information-sensitivity and quantification, we can be very brief. Modals are the paradig-
matic information-sensitive expression; if imperatives are modals, the information-sensitivity at-
tested in conditional imperatives follows directly. On quantification, any good theory of natural
language modality must identify a sense in which a sentence like (22) reports an individual-level
obligation concerning each person’s position relative to their own chair. Once such a theory is in
hand, a theory of how a quantified imperative like (21) tends to generate this sort of individual-
level obligation would seem to be close behind.
4.3 Criticisms
This section briefly advances two criticisms of Kaufmann’s approach, both of which I take to stem
from her account’s more or less orthodox understanding of the shape of clause-type theorizing.
The first criticism is that, perhaps contrary to appearances, Kaufmann, like Portner, lacks any
clear explanation of the canonical discourse role of quantified imperatives like (21), repeated
here as (33):
(33) Everyonei take [his/her/their]i seat
bility with respect to the truth of the modal proposition expressed by the imperative (Kaufmann 2012: Ch. 4). The
conceptual and explanatory role of Epistemic Authority is difficult to understand in Kaufmann’s analysis (for skeptical
discussions, see Charlow 2010, 2011). I pass over it here.
33. This principle receives various formulations in Schwager (2007); Kaufmann & Schwager (2011); Kaufmann
(2012). The formulation here aims to capture the common thread between them. One might worry that this principle
is stipulated to make the account work. Kaufmann argues (see, e.g., Schwager 2007: note 13) that the principle is
independently motivated by the badness of sequences like #go to Kyoto, although I don’t think you should.
15
16 Nate Charlow
From the discussion of Portner’s difficulties with quantified imperatives (§3.4), it is already fairly
clear that the relationship between (i) the ordering source constructed to verify the truth of the
performatively used imperative modal, (ii) the ordering source used in the interpretation of de-
scriptions of addressee-obligations like (22), repeated here as (34), is not as transparent as the
Ordering Source Affirmation principle would seem to suggest.
(34) Everyonei [should/must] take [his/her/their]i seat
The most plausible representation of the ordering source for (33) contains the proposition that
everyone takes his/her/their seat (or else a collection of propositions that together entail this one).
But if this is the ordering source affirmed by the speaker for use in practical deliberation by the
imperative’s addressees, Kaufmann apparently predicts a relationship, not between (33) and the
modal statement in (34), but rather between (33) and the modal statement in (26), repeated here
as (35):
(35) Everyone [should/must] see to it that everyonei takes [his/her/their]i seat
This is, I have already argued, the wrong relationship to predict. Kaufmann’s coarse-grained Or-
dering Source Affirmation principle, like Portner’s suggested coarse-grained link between im-
peratives and To-Do Lists, apparently gets the wrong proposition into the ordering source(s)
relevant for the evaluation of the corresponding modal declarative.
This sort of worry might be somehow finessed. My other worry is more serious. Kauf-
mann endeavors to explain the factors that might “shield the truth value [of an imperative] from
being conversationally accessible” (my emphasis). Even if this explanation succeeded—I have
here argued that it does not—it would not explain why the modal proposition expressed, on her
account, by an imperative would be, as it clearly is, inaccessible to propositional cognition, i.e.,
cognitive . Even if Kaufmann has explained why imperative utterances resist characterization as
true or false in discourse, she has yet to explain why, roughly speaking, imperative thoughts resist
characterization as true or false/likely or unlikely/desirable or undesirable, and so on.34
Somewhat less roughly, according to the account of canonical cognitive roles sketched in
§2.4, canonical cognitive roles for sentences are related to their canonical discourse roles, via
their conventionally proffered contents. According to Kaufmann, the conventionally proffered
content of an imperative is a modal proposition. When that proposition is tokened in discourse
using an imperative, the utterance is assigned a performative interpretation. But when that same
proposition is tokened in thought with an imperative, it is hard to know what to say. While
performativity might explain why the modal proposition expressed, by Kaufmann’s lights, by the
imperative is conversationally inaccessible, the notion of performativity has no clear purchase
when theorizing about an agent’s cognitive system: performativity seems unable to explain why
the modal proposition expressed, by Kaufmann’s lights, by the an imperative is inaccessible to
cognitive environments that select for inputs of propositional type. Provisionally, then, we may
conclude that Kaufmann’s account fails to account for the following facts (and manifold others):
 Probability functions are undefined for imperatives.
 An agent cannot have a desire whose content is imperative.
Here is a possible line of reply. As we have observed, attitude-ascriptions embedding imper-
atives are ungrammatical; thus, it might be suggested that the reason agents cannot have desires
with imperative contents is that there are no grammatical sentences reporting such attitudes. In
34. Compare the critique of Kratzer’s stipulation that probability judgments cannot be directed to the proposition
expressed by a conditional (see, e.g., Kratzer 2012: 107) pursued by Rothschild (2012: 54) and Charlow (2016b).
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reply: the nonexistence of a grammatical way of reporting a state of affairs S has basically no
bearing on whether S is possible. The theorist has (and ought to have) complete freedom to
define a metalanguage unencumbered by the grammatical limitations of natural language. The
probability calculus, to take one obvious example, is such a metalanguage: the only restriction
on applying a probability function Pr to a sentence f is that f’s semantic value is an element of
the Boolean algebra over which Pr is defined. If we are resistant to the notion that an impera-
tive could have a probability (as seems correct), we cannot countenance the notion that imper-
atives have proposition-type semantic values. Similar observations will hold for metalanguages
that contain a truth-predicate or attitude-predicate that is stipulated to select for arguments of
propositional type.
5 Cognition First
On the view I will outline here, tokening an imperative content in thought is a mundane occur-
rence. A speaker tokens such a content when forming the normative judgment that is expressed
by a sincere imperative utterance, and an addressee does it when updating on the content that
is expressed by such an utterance, and thereby coordinating with the speaker on the normative
judgment that her utterance expressed. (A normative judgment, in the intended sense, is a par-
ticular kind of judgment—what kind of judgment, I’ll say more about below—about what the
addressee should or must do.) This section will sketch an analysis of imperatives that attempts
to build on these (admittedly somewhat cryptic) suggestions.35
It remains true that natural languages lack a canonical form for ascribing cognitive states
with imperative contents to agents. That is to say, they lack a form which embeds a clause of
the appropriate type under an attitude verb. In this respect, imperatives are unlike declaratives
and interrogatives; recall example (1). Nevertheless, I will argue, the suggestion that a sincere
imperative utterance tends strongly36 to express a speaker’s normative judgment concerning the
actions of her addressees37 is both sensible and explanatory.
If this is right, the cognitive role of contents of imperative type will be accessible via attitude-
ascriptions that attribute normative judgments to agents. (Indeed, even if it is not right, consid-
eration of normative attitude-ascriptions is, I will argue, a productive way to begin theorizing
about the cognitive role of the imperative.) This appears, at first blush anyway, to be a plausible
prediction. Consider the unremarkable (if tedious) narrative in (36).
(36) a. Bernie thinks Hillary should shut the door
b. So, Bernie plans for Hillary to shut the door
c. So, Bernie tells Hillary to shut the door
d. Hillary accepts Bernie’s utterance
e. So, Hillary comes to think that she should shut the door
f. So, Hillary plans to shut the door
35. The view I defend here descends fromCharlow (2011, 2014a) (which also offer a fuller defense of the view than I
am able to undertake here). I take Condoravdi & Lauer (2012); Harris (2014); Starr (forthcoming) to be in agreement
on much of what I say in this final section. Harris, in particular, describes an cognitive approach to semantic and
pragmatic theorizing (generally, but also specifically for imperatives) that has many affinities with the view I lay out
here. My own view has been influenced in many ways by their work (and, more recently, by Roberts (2015)). A full
comparison is, alas, beyond the purview of this paper.
36. The tendency is imperfect, as can be seen from, e.g., well-wish imperatives like (7). More on this below.
37. Probably within a salient decision problem. Kaufmann, we noted, makes use of the notion of a decision problem
in her unpacking of the Ordering Source Affirmation principle. I have argued elsewhere for the representation of
decision problems (as well as decision theories) in the semantics of prioritizing deliberative modals (see, e.g., Charlow
2016a, forthcoming).
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As this narrative illustrates, normative judgment—of the sort routinely attributed by sentences
like (36a) and (36e)—is plausibly implicated in both the production of a paradigmatic imperative
utterance, as well as its perlocutionary force. I stress that I am not assuming that this holds true
of all paradigmatic imperative utterances. I do assume that this is a useful point from which to
begin theorizing. Let us see where it takes us.
5.1 Internal and External Attitudes
If normative judgment, of the sort attributed by (36a) and (36e), were simply a propositional
attitude, the suggestion to treat such normative judgments as a guide in theorizing about the se-
mantics of imperatives would get us nowhere fast. Very plausibly, however, normative judgment
is not univocally propositional. As others have noticed, it is possible to read (36a) in both what I
will call internal and external senses.38 The external reading of (36a) attributes to Bernie belief in
a propositional content representing the proposition that Hillary shuts the door as required rel-
ative to a salient body of law, preference, regulation, etc. (The propositional complement, in the
case of the external reading of (36a), is analogous to the above-mentioned “reportative” reading
of the prioritizing modal.) The internal reading of (36a), however, attributes to Bernie roughly
the possession of a plan39 according to which it is required that Hillary shut the door. I will take
it as obvious that the state of having a plan that requires x and the state of believing that x is
required, relative to a salient body of law, preference, regulation, etc., are distinct.
How could these two readings of normative judgment-ascriptions exist? How are these two
readings related? Here is one possibility, which would explain both the existence of these read-
ings, as well as the systematic semantic relationship that seems to hold between them:
Imperatives Characterize Modal Propositions
Imperative contents are functionsmapping somekindof argument into amodal
truth condition.
The suggestion, in other words, is to think of (metalinguistic representations of) imperative con-
tents as derived from (metalinguistic representations of) modal propositions through some or-
dinary compositional mechanism, like l-abstraction (Heim & Kratzer 1998).
As illustration, consider the following (extensional) representation of a modal logical form:
 f ,g(Restrictor)(Scope)
This representation follows Kratzer (1981): modals are generalized quantifiers expressing a re-
lation between (i) a domain of quantification jointly characterized by the Modal Base f , the Or-
dering Source g, and a (explicitly or implicitly provided) Restrictor, and (ii) a set of possibilities
characterized by the Scope. Provided we assume that there are finitely many worlds compati-
ble with f , the domain of quantification is simply the set of possibilities compatible with f and
the Restrictor that are minimal in the ordering characterized by g. The relationship expressed
between this domain and the set of possibilities characterized by the modal’s Scope is simply.
A logical form of this shape is tailor-made to account for external (reportative) readings
of modal expressions. Such a logical form expresses the proposition that all possibilities in the
domain of quantification (jointly characterized by f , g, and the Restrictor) witness the truth
38. This is an old, if disputed, observation in the meta-ethical literature on judgment internalism. The Expressivist
Allan Gibbard has developed a “plan-laden” semantics for normative attitude-ascriptions around it (see esp. Gibbard
1990, 2003). For more recent discussion, see Charlow (2015); Cariani (2016); Yalcin (forthcoming).
39. Or preference, or desire, or whatever (though I will generally default to ‘plan’).
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of the Scopal proposition. If an agent stands in a cognitive relationship to this logical form—
e.g., belief—then we may say that the agent believes that the Scopal proposition is required by the
domain of quantification jointly characterized by f , g, and the Restrictor.
A logical form of closely related shape is, I suggest, tailor-made to account for internal read-
ings of modal expressions:
lg[ f ,g(Restrictor)(Scope)]
Such a logical form expresses the property an ordering source g has iff the Scopal proposition is
required by the domain of quantification jointly characterized by f , g, and the Restrictor. As
a convenient shorthand, we may say that this is the property g has when g requires the Scopal
proposition (relative to the relevant Modal Base and Restrictor). Obviously this is not a truth
condition: it is a (modally specified) property of the ordering source. Thus, unlike Kaufmann’s
account, our account is at no risk of misconstruing the canonical cognitive role of imperative
contents as akin to the canonical cognitive roles of propositions.40
There is no antecedent reason to think that an agent could not stand in a cognitive relation-
ship to this sort of logical form. If, for example, an agent’s plans are representable with g, then
we may say that the agent cognitively instantiates the property expressed by this logical form.41
My present suggestion is that we may refer to the adverted sort of cognitive relationship as a
belief—and, more specifically, as an internal normative judgment).
The overarching suggestions of this section have been these.
 External readings of normative judgment-ascriptions ascribe a relationship between an
agent and a propositional content.
 Internal readings of normative judgment-ascriptions ascribe a relationship between an
agent and an imperative content.
 Imperative contents characterize properties of the semantic parameter responsible for
the action-guiding/normative flavor of prioritizing modalities—the ordering source.
 Thepropositional content that is the object of an external normative judgment-ascription
is related to the imperative content that is the object of an internal normative judgment-
ascription by l-abstraction.
I will not argue in any great detail for these suggestions here—though I will try to outline many
of their explanatory attractions. It is, for instance, worth noting that these suggestions together
paint a distinctive (and, so far as I see, quite plausible) picture of narrative (36): (36a) (on its
internal reading) and (36b) ascribe a relationship between Bernie and an imperative content
40. What of the earlier-mentioned criticisms of Kaufmann’s account that target the claim that the compositional
semantics of an imperative is modal (e.g., von Fintel & Iatridou 2009, forthcoming)? Such criticisms do not apply to
the account I have given—I stress that I have not given a compositional semantics for the imperative. Which is to say:
I have not, in this paper, given any account of what an imperative contributes to an environment like the following.
(37) Drink another beer, and you’ll lose your lunch
(38) Stop drinking beer, or you’re grounded
These sorts of “Imperative-and/or-Declarative” constructions are, in my view, probably just equivalent to ordinary
conditionals (cf. Culicover & Jackendoff 1997; Klinedinst & Rothschild 2012). I do not see the proposal I have sug-
gested here as contributing to the analysis of such constructions as conditional in meaning. For all I have said here,
the compositional semantic contribution of an embedded imperative is exhausted by what I have called the Scopal
proposition—in the case of shut the door, Hillary, the proposition that Hillary shuts the door—and the conventionally
proffered content of an imperative is derived from the Scopal proposition at a distinct level of semantic representation.
41. I provide an account of the relationship between a formal semantic object constructed out of possibilia (like an
ordering) and the actual plans or preferences of an agent in Charlow (2015: §5). Neither that account nor the account
presented here is intended as a compositional semantics for belief-ascriptions. Since, however, they are intended as
accounts of the truth conditions of internal and external readings of belief-ascriptions, they should be compositionally
implementable. I see no reason to think they would not be.
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(whichBernie instantiates just if he has a plan representablewith an ordering source satisfying the
property characterized by this imperative content). Bernie tokens this content in discourse when
he utters the imperative shut the door, Hillary. In accepting Bernie’s utterance, Hillary comes to
bear a cognitive relationship to this same imperative content. As with Bernie, this amounts to her
adopting a plan that is representable as an ordering source satisfying the property characterized
by this imperative content.
5.2 Embeddings
This section will extend the foregoing analysis to the two embeddings of imperatives that have
featured in this paper: conditional and quantified imperatives. Let us again begin by considering
normative judgment-ascriptions:
(39) Bernie thinks Hillary should shut the door if it starts to rain
(40) Bernie thinks everyonei should take [his/her/their]i seat
On its internal reading, I suggest that (39) asserts a cognitive relation—here termed Bel—between
Bernie and an imperative content:
Bel(Bernie,lg[ f ,g(it starts to rain)(Hillary shuts the door)])
If imperatives conventionally proffer the property an ordering source has when it requires the
Scopal proposition, conditional imperatives conventionally proffer the property an ordering
source has when it requires the Scopal proposition, against a restriction to possibilities com-
patible with their antecedents. Indicative antecedents play an ordinary compositional restrictive
function—albeit at the level of conventionally proffered content.42 I note in passing that, so long
as the ordering characterized by g depends on the information expressed by the restrictor clause,
this account is well-positioned to account for the information-sensitivity outlined in §3.3.43
On its internal reading, I suggest that (40) asserts the Bel-relation, not between Bernie and
a single imperative content, rather between Bernie and a constellation of imperative contents:44
8x : Bel(Bernie,lg[ f ,g(>)(x takes x’s seat)])
Universal quantifiers play an ordinary quantificational function when they take scope over the
imperative—when, roughly speaking, they take scope over an imperative force operator in the
metalanguage. (When they do so, their semantic function is analogous to conjunction of substi-
tution instances.) If, then, imperatives conventionally proffer the property an ordering source
has when it requires the Scopal proposition, universally quantified imperatives conventionally
proffer a constellation of properties: for each addressee x, the property an ordering source has
42. I am not a proponent of Kratzer’s restrictor analysis of the conditional (see Charlow 2016b), but explaining why
(and how to modify the account to deal with this) would take me too far afield. I will note that I—like most other
folks of the “dynamic” persuasion—think of indicative antecedents (as well as quantifier phrases) as, roughly speak-
ing, devices for expressing context change or discourse operations. From this perspective, the notion that indicative
antecedents (and quantifier phrases) play their main semantic role at the level of conventionally proffered content
(and that quantifier phrases can nevertheless bind downstream pronouns) is expected. A useful formalism for mod-
eling this level of semantic representation is Segmented Discourse Representation Theory (see especially Asher &
Lascarides 2003).
43. For varying accounts of this dependence—which goes by the name of “serious informational dependence” in
the literature—see Kolodny & MacFarlane (2010); Charlow (2013b); Cariani et al. (2013); Carr (2015).
44. Since the imperative in question is unconditional, its logical form is vacuously restricted, to>. A more realistic
analysis, pursued in Charlow (2011: Ch. 4), would treat the modal’s restriction as jointly determined by (i) a variable
tracking contextually imposed restrictions, (ii) explicitly introduced restrictions (if the imperative is conditional). On
the character of modal subordination for imperatives, see Charlow (2011: 184ff).
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when it requires x to realize the Scopal proposition. And this is exactly the sort of story for
quantified imperatives I have suggested is needed.
5.3 Illocution via Cognition
Imperative utterances, on the proposal I have outlined here, conventionally proffer the contents
of (internal readings of) normative judgment-ascriptions. Trivially, they proffer these contents
for acceptance. But how do addressees (or contexts) that accept an imperative utterance update
on an imperative content? I have been speaking in a rough-and-ready way about this issue above.
In this section, I will try to be more precise.
First, a necessary formal refinement. Following Portner, we index ordering sources to agents
(to, inter alia, make room for the intuition that the considerations that bear on a judgment of
what an agent x should do—the ordering source relevant for evaluating a modal judgment of
this form—can vary with x). The conventionally proffered content of an ordinary imperative
can thus be represented by the following schematic logical form:
lxlg[ f ,g(x)(Restrictor)(Scope)]
This function’s individual argument may be associated with a definite individual, provided either
implicitly (e.g., demonstratively) or explicitly (in the case of an explicit addressee imperative like
if it starts to rain, shut the door, Hillary).
lg[ f ,g(Hillary)(it starts to rain)(Hillary shuts the door)]
Or the variable can be bound by the universal quantifier, in which case we arrive at the following
constellation of contents: [
x
flg[ f ,g(x)(Restrictor)(Scope)]g
This is the constellation of contents that results from collating each content of the form
lg[ f ,g(x)(Restrictor)(Scope)] (for each addressee x in the quantifier’s domain).
This refinement in place, we are in a position to state a schematic recipe for determining
how, given an imperative utterance that is accepted, both addressees and contexts update on the
content of that utterance. Step One is a formal assignment of imperative contents.
Step One: Semantics for Imperatives
The imperative interpretation function jj  jj is a functionmapping imperatives
to their contents, where:
jj(if X)(a!Y)jj = flg[ f ,g(a)(X)(Y)]g
jj8x(if X)(x!Y)jj = [
x
flg[ f ,g(x)(X)(Y)]g
Of note: (i) I treat all imperative contents as sets of properties of ordering sources. (In the case of
unquantified imperatives, this set is a singleton.) (ii) I represent a contextually disambiguated
imperative of the form see to it that X, a with the abbreviation a!X. (iii) An ordinary imperative
is treated as a conditional imperative with a restriction to>.45
45. This is not intended as a final or complete statement of the view. It ignores context-sensitivity (and plays fast-
and-loose with use and mention in, e.g., its handling of variables), for one. For two, it does not account for existential
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Step Two: we state a principle linking imperative contents to illocutionary forces or dis-
course moves. Because imperative contents are, in a manner of speaking, properties that can be
instantiated by psychological concreta (e.g., an agent’s plans), the force of an imperative Fimp is,
very simply, to propose that a range of selected states come to “believe” (in the internal sense)
jjFimpjj.46 If jjFimpjj contains a property of the ordering source for agent x—a property of the
form lg[ f ,g(x)(X)(Y)]—the imperative proposes that the state that g(x) represents come to
“believe” (in the internal sense) lg[ f ,g(x)(X)(Y)].
Step Two: Force Assignment for Imperatives
Consider an utterance of the imperative Fimp, where:
jjFimpjj = flg[ f ,g(x1)(X)(Y)], ...,lg[ f ,g(xn)(X)(Y)]g
The force of Fimp is to propose that the salient ordering source for xi satisfy
lg[ f ,g(xi)(X)(Y)] (for each i).
There is a risk this formalism will obscure the simple thought that underlies it: an imperative
utterance, directed at a single addressee x, proposes that x’s plans (equally, the context’s repre-
sentation of x’s plans) come to be representable with an ordering source that requires the imper-
ative’s prejacent. This follows from the fact that, if g(x) is the salient ordering source for x, and
g(x) gives a set of things x plans on, then changing the value of g(x) so that it comes to satisfy
the specified modal property must involve a corresponding change in x’s plans. An imperative
utterance, directed at multiple addressees x1, ..., xn, proposes, for each i, that xi’s plans (equally,
the context’s representation of xi’s plans) come to be representable with an ordering source that
requires the imperative’s prejacent. In a slogan: imperative utterances are conventionally associ-
ated with attempts to get their addressees to plan on realizing their prejacents. In an even briefer
slogan: imperatives conventionally express directive speech acts.
How might the manifold illocutionary forces associated with standard imperative utter-
ances be accounted for on this proposal? Here I must be brief (while pointing my reader to
earlier work). Speaking broadly, command, suggestion, invitation, etc., interpretations will be
construed as determinates of the determinable directive. Since an agent’s plans (and the or-
dering sources that represent her plans) come in many varieties—plans for pursuing what duty
requires, plans for pursuing what her desires require, and so on—and are, additionally, repre-
sented in various loci—by the agent, by the context, and by agents distinct from the agent—this
account’s degree of illocutionary flexibility compares favorably with the degree of illocutionary
flexibility one finds in both Portner’s account: so far as I can see, all the maneuvers that Portner
exploits to account for illocutionary variability are open to the account stated here. A suggestion
or invitation, for instance, may be construed as a proposed update to what an addressee plans
for the sake of pursuing her own desires. A command may be construed as a proposed update
to what an addressee plans for the sake of doing her duty (or perhaps to what an addressee plans
sans phrase). And so on.47
quantification that takes scope over imperative “force”. On existential quantification see Charlow (2011: 155ff).
46. The range of states to which such an update is proposed may include the context. “Belief ” by a context is
analogous to presupposition: a context c believes that p iff p is presupposed at c. On the account suggested here, if a
speaker attempts to update the context with an imperative—I stress that I take no stand on whether speakers should
generally be understood as attempting to do such a thing—the speaker makes a discourse move whose intended effect
is to make an internal normative judgment presupposed.
47. For further details, including how to derive non-directive (permission, instruction) interpretations of imper-
atives under the rubric of indirect speech acts (cf. §2.1), see Charlow (2011: Ch. 3). A brief summary: permission
interpretations are supplied by abduction in contexts where a directive interpretation cannot be attributed to a ratio-
nal speaker. Instruction interpretations (e.g., ‘to get to Union Square, walk along 14th’) are generated by combining
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5.4 Extensions
If imperatives are linked to canonical discourse/cognitive roles by the Force Assignment princi-
ple, how are declaratives and interrogatives linked to canonical discourse/cognitive roles? Sup-
posingwe are in fact after a unified account here, my suggestion herewill be simple and fairly con-
servative. The standard proffered contents of both declaratives and interrogatives—propositions
and questions, respectively—provide recipes for characterizing the cognitive properties one in-
stantiates when one accepts a declarative and accepts an interrogative (in the special sense of
§2.4). The Force Assignment principle may be extended to these properties, and the canonical
discourse roles of declaratives and interrogatives subsumed within it.48
A proposition—to fix ideas, let this be a set of possible worlds—determines the property
of self-locating in one of those possible worlds. A question—to fix ideas, let this be a way of
partitioning a set of possible worlds—determines the property of partitioning the set of worlds in
which one self-locates along the lines of that partition. A declarative that expresses a proposition
p proposes that a salient representation of location inmodal space represent the location as falling
within p. An interrogative that expresses a partition fp, pg proposes that a salient representation
of issues-under-discussion come to partition its information into p-regions and p-regions.
I pitch this as a “conservative” way of extending Force Assignment to cover the other major
clause types. That said, notice that if the interpretation function jj  jjmaps sentences into their
conventionally proffered contents, the conventionally proffered contents of declaratives and in-
terrogatives, like those of imperatives, are just characteristics of abstract entities representing, in
the first instance, a cognitive state of an agent. Semantic theorizing, at this level anyway, is cog-
nitively loaded in a way that may be startling to some practitioners. Startling or not, the analysis
underlying this understanding should be given the chance to earn its linguistic keep.
6 Conclusion
This paper developed a clause-type analysis of the imperative that improved, I argued, on the
major extant clause-type analyses of the imperative: the Dynamic Pragmatic account of Portner,
and the Modal account of Kaufmann.
Portner’s analysis typed clauses in virtue of the semantic types of their proffered contents,
and assigned them a particular force—addition of a proffered content to a set (or sets) of objects
of the same semantic type—in virtue of this type. This analysis ran into difficulty with con-
ditional and quantified imperatives, both of which seem to lack proffered contents of the sort
that would allow conditional and quantified imperatives to play the sort of role in discourse that
they seem, in fact, to play. Portner’s understanding of clause-type theorizing—an understanding
which compels him to identify proffered contents for conditional and quantified imperatives of
a type fit for addition to a To-Do List—limited his options for dealing with these difficulties.
Seen from the vantage of this (admittedly focused) range of explananda, Kaufmann’s anal-
ysis appeared to represent an improvement over Portner’s. By introducing modality into the
analysis of the imperative—via the suggestions that imperatives (i) contain modal quantifiers in
their compositional semantics and (ii) conventionally proffer modal propositions when uttered
an imperative content—a function from an ordering source into a modal proposition—with an ordering source (ex-
pressing the designated goal—in this case, getting to Union Square) by a version of Functional Application. The
instruction imperative is thus interpreted as proffering a modal content: that the addressee should/must perform the
relevant action (walking along 14th) in order to achieve the designated goal (getting to Union Square).
48. For approaches to semantic and pragmatic theorizing that are broadly in this vein (though developed specifically
in the context of a nonpropositional semantics and pragmatics of epistemic and probabilistic operators in declarative
sentences), see Swanson (2006, forthcoming); Yalcin (2011, 2012a); Rothschild (2012); Moss (2015). An important
question that I do not address here is how to fit declaratives that express cognitive properties that are not equivalent to
propositional belief (e.g. epistemic and normative uses of modals) into the broader project of clause-type theorizing.
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in discourse—Kaufmann was able to exploit the flexibility of modal expressions, with respect
to their information-sensitivity, their ability to take scope under quantificational operators, and
their ability to receive performative interpretations. This last ability, impressively, rendered the
imperative’s alleged propositional content inaccessible in discourse and seemed to offer an ap-
pealing account of the discourse role of imperatives of basically any type.
The utility of modal performativity was, however, limited. Clause-type analysis aspires to
offer a theory of proffered content. One therefore expects a clause-type analysis to explain the sorts
of changes in both common and individual attitudes that result when the proffered content of an
imperative is tokened in thought (for, e.g., the sake of being updated on). A propositional analysis
of the imperative could not explain why, for example, an imperative could not be entertained as
likely, true, or desirable.
A common feature of these accounts was their attempt to exploit coarse-grained discourse
principles—Portner’s Force Assignment, Kaufmann’s Ordering Source Affirmation—connecting
utterances of typed clauses to (para-)illocutionary forces—To-Do List addition, for Portner, and
affirmation of the ordering source, for Kaufmann. In both cases, any connection of an impera-
tive to the truth of a corresponding modal sentence was indirect or derived—resulting from the
application of the relevant discourse principle to the utterance’s claimed proffered content.
On the “Cognition First” account advanced in this paper, the connection between imper-
atives and corresponding modal sentences was not indirect in this fashion. On this account,
the content of an imperative may be simply read off the content of a corresponding normative
judgment-ascription (on what I called its internal reading). An utterance proffering this con-
tent in discourse is associated with a very natural discourse role: a proposal, roughly, that an
addressee x come to share the speaker’s view of what x should do.
Like Kaufmann’s account, my account exploited the scope-taking abilities and information-
sensitivity of modal expressions in accounting for quantified and conditional imperatives. Un-
like Kaufmann’s account, I required neither that modal expressions figure in the compositional
semantics of imperatives, nor that imperatives proffer modal propositional contents that are,
quite exceptionally, inaccessible in conversation or cognition. An imperative, on my analysis,
expresses a characteristic of a plan (by expressing a characteristic of an ordering source). Such
characteristics are not evaluable for truth, in conversation or cognition. To adopt such a charac-
teristic is to come to have a certain kind of plan, not to commit oneself to representing the world
in any sort of fashion.
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